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Summary
•	 Ukraine	is	deeply	divided	internally,	but	in	this	respect	it	is	not	
significantly	different	 from	many	other	countries	 in	Europe	
and	the	world.	As	a	result	of	the	changes	that	have	taken	place	
since	 its	 independence,	 the	country’s	 internal	divisions	now	
have	less	and	less	to	do	with	territorial	divides,	and	the	split	
into	historical	‘sub-Ukraines’	has	become	less	pronounced,	es-
pecially	for	the	younger	generation.	Several	factors	have	con-
tributed	to	strengthening	Ukraine’s	unity,	including	a	school	
education	system	that	has	reinforced	the	perception	that	uni-
ty	is	the	natural	state	of	affairs.	Other	factors	include	the	sta-
bilisation	of	 the	 state	 structures,	 including	 the	bureaucracy	
with	its	tendency	to	preserve	the	status quo.	In	the	meantime,	
however,	social	and	generational	divisions	have	become	more	
visible.	These	may	pose	a	challenge	to	Ukraine’s	 internal	or-
der,	but	not	to	its	unity.	
•	 Ukraine	is	not	a	country	of	two	competing	regional	identities,	
one	 in	 the	west,	 the	other	 in	 the	east.	The	western	 identity,	
with	 sobornost’	 (the	 unity	 and	 indivisibility	 of	 Ukraine)	 as	
a	key	value,	coexists	with	the	multiple	and	diverse	local	patri-
otisms	of	the	different	regions	in	the	east	and	the	south	of	the	
country,	as	well	as	a	specific	Transcarpathian	identity.	Crimea	
is	an	exception	here,	because	in	most	respects	it	has	remained	
unaffected	by	the	dynamics	of	the	social	processes	transform-
ing	mainland	Ukraine.	
•	 The	present	protest	movement	(the	broadly-understood	Maid-
an)	has	consolidated	the	country’s	sense	of	unity.	The	indivis-
ibility	of	Ukraine	has	been	championed	not	only	by	the	pro-
testers	in	the	Maidan,	but	also	by	people	in	the	Yanukovych	
camp;	and	even	the	backers	of	 the	ousted	 leadership	tend	to	
raise	 separatist	 slogans	 only	 exceptionally.	 Claims	 about	
the	 impending	split,	or	 federalisation,	of	 the	country,	which	
have	in	large	part	been	a	product	of	the	media,	are	aimed	at	
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sabotaging	 the	Maidan,	but	 there	 is	no	political	programme	
behind	them.	
•	 It	 is	 quite	 likely	 that	 most	 of	 those	 claims	 are	 inspired	 by,	
or	come	from,	 the	Russian	Federation,	and	that	 they	are	ad-
dressed	to	Western	public	opinion,	which	has	been	uncritical	
of	 reports	of	an	 impending	 ‘division	of	Ukraine’.	From	Mos-
cow’s	 point	 of	 view,	 a	 division	 of	 Ukraine	 would	 be	 hardly	
advantageous	to	Russian	interests.	Russia	would	have	to	pay	
a	price	for	keeping	the	eastern	and	southern	parts	of	Ukraine	
within	its	orbit,	and	that	price	would	be	the	emergence	of	a	de-
cisively	hostile	western	Ukrainian	state,	as	well	as	a	number	
of	other	adverse	international	consequences.	Russia’s	aim	is	to	
preserve	 its	 influence	throughout	 the	whole	of	Ukraine,	and	
not	just	in	parts	of	it.	The	annexation	of	Crimea	in	March	2014	
does	not	invalidate	this	assessment.	
•	 A	protracted	civil	war	is	the	only	scenario	in	which	Ukraine	
could	really	face	disintegration.	However,	since	Ukrainian	so-
ciety	is	not	split	into	two	conflicting	groups,	such	a	war	(going	
beyond	clashes,	possibly	involving	armed	action,	between	the	
people	and	the	government)	 is	highly	unlikely.	It	would	also	
run	counter	to	the	interests	of	all	parties	to	the	present	con-
flict	and	its	observers.	
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IntroductIon
The	wave	of	protests	that	has	gripped	Ukraine	since	late	Novem-
ber	2013,	provoked	by	Kyiv’s	decision	not	to	sign	the	association	
agreement	with	the	European	Union,	has	since	transformed	into	
an	anti-government	movement	seeking	deep	political	change.	In	
the	course	of	the	protests	both	sides	have	raised	the	threat	of	dis-
integration,	or	even	a	political	division	of	Ukraine.	Some	of	them	
have	warned	against	the	consequences	of	deepening	internal	di-
visions	in	the	event	of	the	conflict	continuing,	while	others	have	
advocated	a	formal	division	of	the	country,	arguing	that	this	of-
fers	a	chance	to	avoid	its	uncontrolled	disintegration.	Such	claims	
have	worried	many	people,	 also	 beyond	Ukraine,	 about	 the	 du-
rability	of	the	Ukrainian	state,	and	galvanised	traditional	views	
about	the	depth	and	power	of	the	country’s	internal	divisions.	
However,	those	views	are	largely	obsolete.	They	fail	to	take	into	
account	the	changes	that	have	occurred	over	the	nearly	quarter-
century	of	Ukraine’s	existence	as	a	state.	A	generation	which	has	
never	experienced	any	reality	other	than	the	independent	Ukrain-
ian	state	in	its	current	borders	has	already	grown	up	in	Ukraine.	
The	way	the	protests	have	unfolded	so	far	has	shown	that	the	link	
between	political	and	social	divisions	on	the	one	hand,	and	histor-
ical	and	territorial	splits	on	the	other,	is	increasingly	weak.	The	
Maidan	has	become	an	integrating	element	which	has	strength-
ened	the	young	generation’s	belief	that	the	homeland	is	a	supreme	
good,	and	that	democracy	and	pro-Western	policies	serve	the	in-
terests	of	young	people	in	all	regions	of	Ukraine.	Moreover,	even	
among	those	who	oppose	the	pro-Western	option	there	are	hardly	
any	advocates	of	division	of	the	country,	even	in	the	form	of	fed-
eralisation.	
The	present	paper	will	discuss	the	historical	origins	of	Ukraine’s	
internal	 diversity,	 and	 will	 then	 show	 how	 this	 diversity	 has	
changed	over	time	as	a	result	of	the	emergence	and	existence	of	
the	 independent	Ukrainian	state.	 It	will	also	briefly	discuss	 the	
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way	in	which	Ukrainian	intellectuals	approach	the	country’s	in-
ternal	divisions	today.	In	the	following	sections	it	will	delve	into	
the	impact	of	the	ongoing	protests	on	the	formation	of	a	sense	of	
civil	unity	in	Ukraine,	and	the	political	significance	of	the	propo-
sition	of	federalising	the	country.	The	final	part	will	reflect	on	the	
position	of	the	Russian	Federation	and	the	consequences	for	Rus-
sia	of	Ukraine’s	potential	division.
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I. the factorS of ukraIne’S Internal 
dIverSIty 
Ukraine	is	a	country	of	great	internal	diversity,	but	it	would	not	
be	difficult	to	name	countries	that	are	more	diversified	than	it	is	
while	at	the	same	time	being	much	smaller	(for	instance	Belgium).	
Ukraine	has	existed	as	an	independent	state	since	1991,	and	was	
given	 its	 current	 territorial	 shape	 in	 1944,	 as	 a	 Soviet	 republic.	
Ten	years	later,	Crimea	was	attached	to	it,	but,	as	the	peninsula	
had	never	before	been	associated	with	any	state	entity	that	could	
be	regarded	as	Ukrainian	and	differs	from	continental	Ukraine	in	
almost	every	respect,	it	will	be	excluded	from	further	analysis.
Ukraine’s	most	 important	 historical	 division,	 albeit	 one	 that	 is	
seldom	mentioned	today,	concerns	the	 line	between	the	histori-
cal	Rus,	which	has	been	part	of	Europe	for	a	thousand	years,	and	
the	area	of	the	Great	Steppe	in	the	east	and	south	of	the	country,	
incorporated	 into	 the	 European	 civilizational	 space	 only	 in	 the	
late	eighteenth	century.	The	second	most	important	dividing	line	
separates	 those	 lands	 which	 were	 part	 of	 the	 Russian	 Empire	
from	the	end	of	the	eighteenth	century,	and	those	annexed	by	the	
Soviet	Union	during	World	War	II	(Volhynia	being	a	special	case	
here,	as	the	region	was	separated	from	the	Russian/Soviet	state	
during	the	inter-war	period).	
Those	 historical	 divisions	 are	 reflected	 in	Ukraine’s	 ethnic	 and	
religious	splits.	Rural	areas	in	most	of	Ukraine	are	inhabited	by	
ethnic	Ukrainians.	Large	Russian	communities	exist	only	in	the	
southern	oblasts	 and	 the	Donetsk	Basin,	but	 substantial	 groups	
of	Russians	 also	 live	 in	Ukraine’s	major	 cities,	 especially	 in	 the	
eastern	and	southern	parts	of	the	country.	In	the	east,	substan-
tial	swathes	of	the	society	do	not	profess	any	ethnic	 identity,	as	
a	 result	 of	decades	of	Sovietisation.	The	Greek	Catholic	 religion	
is	dominant	in	Eastern	Galicia,	and	Orthodox	Christianity	is	the	
main	religion	in	the	rest	of	the	country.	However,	in	the	east	and	
the	south,	mostly	but	not	only	in	cities,	atheists	and	people	who	do	
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not	identify	with	any	confession	constitute	a	substantial	propor-
tion	of	the	population.	
The	 fact	 that	 some	 regions	 were	 subjected	 to	 Sovietisation	 for	
longer	than	others	is	also	reflected	in	the	deep	ideological	and	po-
litical	divisions	in	Ukraine:	the	western	oblasts	(as	well	as	Kyiv,	
which	 is	 home	 to	 huge	 numbers	 of	migrants	 from	 the	western	
part	 of	 the	 country)	were	 already	more	disposed	 towards	 inde-
pendent	political	and	civil	activity	towards	the	end	of	the	Soviet	
area	(and	thereafter,	they	also	displayed	a	stronger	entrepreneur-
ial	spirit).	The	further	east,	the	less	people	were	willing	to	act	on	
their	own,	and	the	more	they	tended	to	expect	the	government	to	
dictate	 solutions.	However,	 even	 in	western	Ukraine,	Sovietism	
undermined	the	civil	and	patriotic	traditions,	and	‘infected’	the	
national	and	nationalist	movements	with	elements	of	Communist	
ideology	and	the	low	intellectual	standards	typical	of	the	Soviet	
mentality.1	
*
Today	many	of	those	divisions	are	treated	as	aspects	of	the	under-
lying	territorial	division.	Yet	after	seven	decades	of	more	or	less	
free	internal	migrations,	this	approach	is	largely	obsolete.	Many	
Russians	and	Ukrainians	from	the	east	live	in	the	cities	of	western	
Ukraine,	and	even	larger	numbers	of	migrants	from	the	west	of	
Ukraine,	as	well	as	their	children	and	grandchildren,	are	present	
in	the	industrial	cities	of	eastern	and	southern	Ukraine.	There	are	
hundreds	of	thousands	of	regionally	mixed	families.	Migrants	of	
this	kind	are	even	present	in	Crimea	–	if	the	Soviet	industry	in	the	
peninsula	 attracted	 at	 least	 30,000	 job	migrants	 from	Belarus,2	
then	 there	must	 have	 been	 a	 considerable	 proportion	 of	 people	
1	 For	more	information	see	Tadeusz	A.	Olszański,	Kresy	zachodnie.	Miejsce	
Galicji	Wschodniej	 i	Wołynia	w	 państwie	 ukraińskim,	Prace OSW,	 nr	 43,	
Warsaw,	2013,	pp.	61-62.
2	 According	to	the	2001	census.
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coming	from	the	western	oblasts	who	migrated	to	the	Soviet	in-
dustrial	 centres	 in	 droves	 among	 the	 500,000	 Ukrainians	 who	
migrated	 to	 the	 peninsula.	 Kyiv’s	 demographic	 continuity	 was	
effectively	interrupted	by	the	last	war,	and	the	city’s	current	in-
habitants	 hail	 from	places	 throughout	Ukraine	 (as	well	 as	Rus-
sia	and	other	Soviet	republics).	That	is	because,	as	the	capital	of	
an	independent	state,	the	city	has	been	an	attractive	destination	
for	 large	 numbers	 of	 intellectuals	 and	 entrepreneurs	 from	 the	
entire	country.	Finally,	all	regions	of	Ukraine,	and	the	cities	and	
industrial	 centres	 in	 particular,	 are	 home	 to	millions	 of	 immi-
grants	from	other	parts	of	the	former	Soviet	Union,	their	children	
and	grandchildren,3	whose	ties	with	Ukraine	as	a	homeland	are	
naturally	weaker	than	those	of	families	who	have	been	living	in	
Ukraine	for	centuries.	
In	all	regions	of	Ukraine,	people	speak	Ukrainian	as	well	as	Rus-
sian	 and	 surzhyk,4	 albeit	 in	 different	 proportions:	 Ukrainian	 is	
predominant	in	the	western	and	central	oblasts,	and	Russian	in	
the	south	and	the	east	(however,	Ukrainian	is	also	spoken	in	the	
rural	areas	of	eastern	Ukraine,	and	surzhyk	is	the	most	common	
language	in	the	cities	in	central	Ukraine).	The	younger	generation	
of	Ukrainians	have	learnt	the	Ukrainian	language	and	literature	
in	school,	as	well	as	the	history	of	Ukraine,	(and	not	the	history	of	
the	Soviet	Union,	i.e.	Russia);	and	for	a	decisive	majority,	Ukrain-
ian	has	been	the	language	of	instruction	for	the	other	subjects.	
Atheists	and	religiously	indifferent	people	account	for	a	large	pro-
portion	of	the	urban	populations	throughout	Ukraine,	and	Greek	
Catholic	communities	are	also	present	in	cities	everywhere	in	the	
country	(the	metropolia	of	the	Greek	Catholic	church	is	currently	
3	 For	 more	 information	 see	 Tadeusz	 A.	 Olszański,	 ‘The	 language	 issue	 in	
Ukraine.	An	attempt	at	a	new	perspective’,	OSW Studies	 issue	40,	Warsaw	
2012,	pp.	10-12.	
4	 Surzhyk	is	a	way	of	mixing	elements	of	Ukrainian	and	Russian,	without	any	
discernible	rule.	See	Tadeusz	A.	Olszański,	‘The	language	issue	in	Ukraine	…’,	
op. cit.,	pp.	12-13.
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based	in	Kyiv),	and	Orthodox	Christianity,	introduced	in	western	
Ukraine	in	the	1940s,	still	holds	considerable	influence	in	the	ru-
ral	areas	there.	
All	this	does	not	mean	that	Ukraine	is	becoming	less	diversified.	
However,	the	territorial	aspect	of	its	internal	divisions	has	been	
losing	 importance	 (while	 not	 disappearing	 altogether),	 and	 the	
links	between	the		individual	present-day	divisions	and	the	his-
torical-regional	splits	have	been	less	and	conspicuous.	As	a	result,	
the	country’s	diversity	poses	less	and	less	of	a	threat	to	its	politi-
cal	unity,	although	it	remains	a	major	internal	policy	challenge.	
It	 also	 remains	 a	 convenient	 object	 of	manipulation,	 especially	
during	political	crises.	
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II. the factorS of ukraIne’S new unIty
In	Ukraine,	as	in	the	other	post-communist	states,	two	new,	very	
deep	 and	 significant	 splits	 have	 emerged	 over	 the	 last	 twenty	
years:	the	social	divide,	and	the	generational	divide.	The	former	
has	 replaced	 the	 relative	 homogeneity	 of	 the	 Soviet	 society,	 in	
which	the	vast	majority	of	people	were	employees	of	state-owned	
entities	(offices,	public	services	and	enterprises),	with	a	plurality	
of	 social	 classes	 and	groups.	 It	 also	has	 led	 to	 the	 emergence	of	
drastic	and	readily	visible	social	disparities	(in	Soviet	times,	the	
extremes	of	wealth	and	poverty	were	hidden),	and	openly	dispar-
aging	attitudes	towards	wage	hired	workers		(which,	for	example,	
have	manifested	themselves	in	delays	of	salary	payments	to	em-
ployees	in	the	public	sector,	 lasting	many	months	or	even	many	
years	in	a	certain	period).	Those	phenomena,	related	to	the	grad-
ual	replacement	of	the	command	economy	with	market	economy	
models	more	typical	of	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century	
than	the	present	day,5	were	particularly	severe	in	the	great	indus-
trial	centres	of	eastern	Ukraine	and	 in	rural	areas,	but	 they	af-
fected	all	of	Ukraine	and	were	also	felt	in	Lviv	and	Lutsk.	
The	emergence	of	the	second,	generational	split	is	directly	relat-
ed	to	 the	 fact	 that	Ukraine	has	been	an	 independent	state	since	
1991.	This	means	that	its	citizens	who	started	school	in	that	year	
or	 later	do	not	 remember	 any	 reality	 other	 than	 the	Ukrainian	
state.	Ukraine	within	its	current	borders	is	their	existing	reality,	
something	unquestioned.	Adult	Ukrainian	nationals	who	started	
their	education	after	1991	(i.e.	those	born	in	the	years	1984–1995)	
numbered	 around	 7	million	 in	 2013,	 accounting	 for	 over	 15%	 of	
the	 country’s	 population.	 Those	 among	 them	 who	 have	 better	
education	have	been	the	main	force	behind	the	present	protests,	
5	 Cf.	Anders	Aslund,	‘Comparative	Oligarchy:	Russia,	Ukraine	and	the	United	
States’, CASE Studies and Analysis	 no	 296,	Warsaw	2005.	http://www.case-
research.eu/upload/publikacja_plik/4931074_SA%20296last.pdf	
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but	even	for	their	less	educated	peers,	from	among	whom	the	so-
called	titushki hail,6	Ukraine	is	the	only	reality	they	know.	
The	modernisation	processes	 taking	place	 in	Ukraine	have	 also	
thinned	 out	 the	 differences	 between	 regions.	 This	 particular-
ly	 concerns	 the	 rise	 of	 popular	 culture	 and	 the	westernisation	
(Anglicisation)	of	both	the	Russian	and	the	Ukrainian	language.	
These	processes	have	been	developing	in	a	very	similar	way	in	all	
regions,	and	the	linguistic	innovations	in	Russian	and	Ukrainian	
have	in	many	cases	been	identical.	
School	education,	whereby	all	young	Ukrainians	have	been	learn-
ing	 the	 Ukrainian	 language	 and	 Ukrainian	 history,	 geography	
and	literature	according	to	a	uniform	programme,	has	been	a	key	
factor	in	forming	the	Ukraine’s	new	unity.	Even	if	some	of	those	
young	people	do	show	a	certain	aversion	to	these	subjects,	treat-
ing	them	either	as	elements	of	a	foreign	tradition	or,	more	often,	
as	part	of	schooling	as	such,	all	of	them,	from	Uzhhorod	to	Mari-
upil,	still	learn	the	same	things	at	the	same	age	and	in	the	same	
form.	 They	 not	 only	 read	 Shevchenko’s	 poetry,	 but	 are	 also	 ex-
posed	to	the	belief	that	he	was	the	poet-prophet,	‘our	everything’,	
the	alpha	and	omega	of	national	 culture.	They	 study	 the	heroic	
(but	also	anarchist)	tradition	of	the	Cossacks,	and	absorb	the	nar-
rative	 according	 to	which	 the	Ukrainian	nation	has	 always	 (for	
at	least	a	thousand	years)	fought	for	independence	and	sobornost’	
for	the	integrity	of	all	ethnically	Ukrainian	areas	within	a	single	
state	organism.	The	symbolic	places	of	Ukraine,	as	understood	in	
this	way,	are	neither	in	the	west	nor	in	the	east	of	the	country.	The	
west	is	indeed	too	‘western’,	and	does	not	have	enough	of	the	Cos-
sack	and	Shevchenko	spirit	in	it,	while	the	east	has	no	history	be-
fore	the	nineteenth	century.	The	symbolic	core	of	Ukraine	lies	in	
6	 Titushki is	 a	 term	 that	 refers	 to	 young	 people	 from	 working	 class	 back-
grounds,	often	hooligans,	recruited	by	the	security	services	to	disrupt	dem-
onstrations	 and	 persecute	 protesters.	 The	 term	 comes	 from	 the	 name	 of	
Vadym	Titushko,	who	beat	a	journalist	during	an	opposition	demonstration	
in	2013.
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middle-Dnieper	Ukraine:	its	heart	beats	in	Kyiv,	Kaniv	and	Chy-
hyryn,	in	Kholodnyi	Yar	and	Khortytsia.7	Perhaps	one	should	also	
mention	Chernobyl,	located	not	far	from	Kyiv,	which	has	been	one	
of	the	symbols	of	Ukraine	since	1986.	
These	are	the	elements	that	 ‘organise’	 the	imagination	of	young	
citizens	of	Ukraine.	They	focus	thinking	on	Ukraine	around	the	
country’s	 centre	 and	 its	 unity.	 They	 are	 reinforced	 by	 the	 sig-
nificance	attached	in	the	learning	of	national	history	to	the	two	
events	which	 integrated	 all	 the	 regions:	 the	Holodomor	 and	 the	
Great	 Patriotic	War	 (while	 the	 1917–1920	 independence	 struggle	
and	the	activities	of	the	Ukrainian	Insurgent	Army	(UPA)	receive	
less	attention	in	history	education,	and	the	latter	is	neglected	in	
many	regions).	As	a	result,	only	7%	of	Ukrainians	back	 the	 fed-
eralisation	of	Ukraine,	and	only	8%	of	the	inhabitants	of	Donbas	
and	just	1%	of	the	people	in	Eastern	Galicia	support	their	regions’	
separation	from	Ukraine.8	Among	the	young	generation,	the	pop-
ularity	of	federalisation	and	secession	is	even	lower.9	
*
7	 Kyiv	is	the	real	and	symbolic	capital	of	the	country,	the	location	of	Ukraine’s	
holiest	national	site,	Saint	Sophia’s	Cathedral,	erected	a	thousand	years	ago.	
Kaniv	is	the	resting	place	of	Taras	Shevchenko,	who	was	also	born	not	far	
from	 there.	 Chyhyryn	was	 the	 capital	 of	 Bohdan	Khmelnytsky’s	 Cossack	
state.	 Kholodnyi	 Yar	 is	 a	 forest	 range	 near	 Chyhyryn,	 a	 hideaway	 of	 the	
Haidamaky	 and	 the	 insurgents	of	 1918–1922,	 and	finally	Khortytsia	 (today	
part	of	the	city	of	Zaporizhia,	550	km	from	Kyiv	down	the	Dnieper	river)	was	
the	main	seat	of	the	Zaporizhian	Sich.	
8	 Research	by	 the	 centre	Rejting	 e,	 quoted	 after	 Ivan	Malyshko,	 ‘Mifotvor-
chist’	pro	rozkol	kraiiny’,	Komentari,	Issue	3,	2014.	
9	 Research	carried	out	by	the	Razumkov	Centre	in	December	2013	shows	that	
a	 substantial	majority	of	Ukrainians	oppose	both	 federalisation	and	divi-
sion	 of	 the	 country	 (61–80%	 of	 votes	 against,	 depending	 on	 the	 variant).	
People	in	the	eastern	region	and	southern	region	of	which	Crimea	is	part,	
were	also	mostly	opposed	to	such	projects	(53	and	63%	respectively	opposed	
federalisation,	and	87	and	81%	respectively	opposed	the	separation	of	their	
home	region).	The	published	version	of	the	research	results	does	not	include	
a	 breakdown	 of	 the	 data	 by	 generation.	 http://glavcom.ua.articles/17966.
html,	accessed	on	4	March	2014.	
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The	 continued	 existence	 and	 consolidation	 of	 the	 formal	 struc-
tures	of	the	state	has	also	had	a	stabilising	effect	on	the	unity	and	
indivisibility	 of	Ukraine.	 The	Ukrainian	 bureaucracy	 (the	 state	
apparatus	 in	 the	broad	sense),	which	existed	as	an	autonomous	
subsystem	 even	 before	 1991,	 quickly	 transformed	 into	 an	 inde-
pendent,	 closed	 system,	 developing	 its	 own	 patterns	 of	 action	
and	 hierarchic	 structures	 (it	 is	 irrelevant	 here	 that	 they	 were	
often	archaic	and	criminally	pathogenic).	Its	group	interests	are	
linked	with	 the	 state,	which	 is	 the	 source	 of	 status,	 prosperity	
and	power.	The	bureaucracy	is	uninterested	in	undermining	the	
state,	and	certainly	not	 in	 its	break-up,	also	 for	another	reason:	
it	is	an	inert	group	interested	in	preserving	the	status quo,	which	
perceives	change	mainly	as	a	threat	to	the	established	structure	
of	procedures,	dependencies	and	privileges.	
The	bureaucratic	centralism	characteristic	of	Ukraine’s	internal	
system	of	government	has	contributed	 to	 the	country’s	unity	 in	
one	more	way:	by	attracting	 large	numbers	of	members	of	 local	
business	 and	 intellectual	 elites	 to	 the	 capital,	 and	 in	 this	 way	
brain-draining	 the	 regions	 (only	Kharkiv	has	 for	 the	most	part	
resisted	this	process10).	All	in	all,	this	has	been	unfavourable	for	
Ukraine,	but	has	strengthened	its	unity.	Any	potential	separatist	
tendencies	in	the	eastern	regions	have	been	undermined	by	the	
fact	that	at	most	times	during	independence,	their	elites	enjoyed	
a	stronger	position	in	Kyiv	and	had	a	decisive	say	in	the	affairs	of	
the	state.	
Strong	 regional	 identifications	 in	 Ukraine	 (mainly	 in	 Donbas,	
Kharkiv	and	Odessa,	and	also	in	Transcarpathia)	have	the	nature	
10	 Kharkiv,	Ukraine’s	second	largest	city,	was	the	capital	of	the	Ukrainian	SSR	
in	 the	years	 1917–1934.	 It	 is	 an	 important	 industrial	 and	academic	 centre,	
and	its	inhabitants	retain	a	strong	sense	of	local	identity	(it	is	still	common	
there	to	refer	to	Kharkiv	as	the	‘first	capital’).	On	the	other	hand,	the	fact	
that	 the	Kharkiv	elites	 (unlike	 those	of	Lviv,	Dnipropetrovsk	or	Donetsk)	
have	never	 been	 involved	 in	 governing	 the	 country	 on	 a	 larger	 scale	 has	
slowed	down	their	outflow	to	the	capital.	
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of	local	patriotisms.	So	far	these	have	not	engendered	any	separa-
tist	aspirations11	or	ambitions	to	gain	autonomy	(although	Trans-
carpathia	may	become	an	exception	here:	it	has	a	Hungarian	mi-
nority	which	 is	 very	 large,	 considering	 the	 scale	 of	 the	 region,	
and	is	also	seeing	the	development	of	a	political	concept	of	a	local	
Rusyn	 identity).	However,	 there	 is	a	growing	opposition	 to	cen-
tralism,	the	hierarchic	system	of	administration	and	the	fiction	
of	local	self-governance,	and	calls	for	the	regions	to	become	more	
independent	 from	the	centre	have	been	gaining	popularity.	But	
this	new	tendency	has	 in	 fact	united	 the	regional	elites	around	
a	new,	shared	objective.
11	 Cf.	e.g.:	Donbas.	A	Stagnation	Period	(interview	with	a	Donetsk	sociologist	
Oksana	Mikheyeva),	The Ukrainian Week,	4	February	2014.	http://ukrainian-
week.com/Society/100514	
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III. the dIScourSe of ‘two ukraIneS’
One	 often	hears	 in	Ukraine	 (and	beyond)	 that	 there	 are	 in	 fact	
two	Ukraines:	the	‘(pro-)Western’	one,	which	historically,	socially	
and	ideologically	belongs	in	Eastern	Europe,	and	the	 ‘(pro-)Rus-
sian’	one,	which	is	a	kind	of	no	man’s	land,	an	object	of	nation	and	
state-building	efforts	by	Ukraine	and	Russia.	Mykola	Ryabchuk	is	
the	principal	contemporary	exponent	of	this	theory.	He	is	a	well-
known	intellectual	who	applies	post-colonial	theory	to	the	study	
of	Ukraine’s	 internal	 divisions,	 and	who	denies	 the	 inhabitants	
of	most	of	 the	eastern	part	of	 the	country	 the	right	 to	be	called	
Ukrainians,	calling	them	Creoles	instead.12	Ukraine’s	most	distin-
guished	historian	 of	 the	middle	 generation,	Yaroslav	Hrytsak,13	
and	 the	 writer	 and	 journalist	 Oksana	 Zabuzhko,14	 are	 among	
those	who	have	fiercely	criticised	Ryabchuk’s	concepts.	However,	
an	attitude	of	superiority,	if	not	outright	disdain,	towards	the	‘na-
tionally	and	socially	backward’	inhabitants	of	Donbas	or	Odessa	
can	also	be	found	in	the	writings	of	Zabuzhko	(who	comes	from	
western	Ukraine)	and	many	others	(but	not	Hrytsak).	
Maksym	Vikhrov,	a	Lviv-based	journalist,	has	recently	come	up	
with	a	bitter	summary	of	the	attitudes	of	the	western	Ukrainian	
intellectual	elites	towards	the	people	of	the	eastern	and	southern	
oblasts,	 and	 Donbas	 in	 particular.15	 According	 to	 his	 diagnosis,	
which	can	also	be	applied	to	considerable	parts		of	the	Kyiv	elite,	
the	west	regards	the	“easterners”	as:	(1)	“degenerate	cattle”	unable	
to	experience	civil	and	national	sentiments,	or	any	nobler	emo-
tions;	(2)	foreign	“non-Ukrainians”	who	are	incapable	of	becoming	
12	 Cf.	Mykola	Ryabchuk,	Dwie	Ukrainy,	Wrocław	2004.	
13	 Cf.	 Ukraina.	 Przewodnik	 Krytyki	 Politycznej.	 Z	 Jarosławem	 Hrycakiem	
rozmawia	Iza	Chruślińska,	Warsaw	2009.	
14	 Cf.	Ukraiński	palimpsest.	Oksana	Zabużko	w	rozmowie	z	Izą	Chruślińską,	
Wrocław	2013.	
15	 Maksym	Vikhrov,	 ‘Chomu	 shid	 ne	 z	Maidanom’,	 http://zaxid.net/homer/
showSingleNews.do?chomu_shid_ne_z_maydanom&objectId=130066,	ac-
cessed	on	10	January	2014.	
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involved	in	the	struggle	for	the	country’s	freedom,	(3)	ignorant	of	
the	 important	 aims	 and	objectives	 of	 the	protest	movements	 in	
“true”	Ukraine.	Vikhrov	goes	on	to	say	that	the	“‘pro-Ukrainian’	
(…)	political	forces	have	for	years	made	every	effort	to	make	the	
east	an	enemy,	rather	than	an	ally”	and	points	to	such	examples	
as	the	statement	by	the	famous	writer	Vasyl	Shklar	that	Donbas	is	
the	“gangrene	of	Ukraine”,	etc.	
However,	it	is	true	that	while	the	“western”	Ukrainians	(wherev-
er	they	live	today)	do	devote	a	great	deal	of	attention	to	the	ques-
tion	of	the	unity	of	the	country	and	nation,	such	reflections	are	
harder	to	find	in	the	east	and	the	south,	and	so	is	the	sense	that	
they	areneeded.	No	separate	identity	is	being	born	here:	the	old	
sense	of	pride	of	 the	 inhabitants	of	 “the	Union’s	 furnace-room”,	
i.e.	Donbas,	or	the	“rocket	capital”,	meaning	Dnipropetrovsk,	was	
too	deeply	Soviet	 in	nature,	 and	 too	 closely	 linked	 to	 the	 exist-
ence	of	the	Soviet	state,	to	survive	in	any	form	other	than	the	nos-
talgia	of	the	departing	generation.	Under	the	influence	of	school	
programmes,	the	young	generation	has	been	adopting	an	‘all-na-
tional’	identity	narrative,	which	leaves	little	room	for	local	identi-
ties.	As	a	result,	only	“some	of	the	local	inhabitants	have	become	
involved	in	the	all-Ukrainian	[political]	process.	And	even	those	
who	did	entered	politics	not	as	advocates	of	the	interests	of	their	
regions	vis-à-vis	the	rest	of	Ukraine,	but	as	representatives	of	the	
rest	of	Ukraine	vis-à-vis	the	regions”.16	
This	 type	 of	 identity	 discourse	 among	 Ukrainian	 intellectuals	
hardly	contributes	 to	building	 the	country’s	unity,	but	nor	does	
it	foment	its	disintegration,	because	it	does	not	lead	to	the	forma-
tion	of	two	competing	national	identity	projects.	The	disparaging	
attitude	 of	 the	 ‘westerners’	 (not	 only	 the	 intellectuals)	 to	 their	
compatriots	in	the	east	and	south	has	only	provoked	the	people	in	
those	regions	to	develop	an	aversion	to	the	‘Banderites’	from	Lviv	
16	 Kostyantyn	Levin,	 ‘Dvadtsyatimilyonna	provintsia’,	www.pravda.com.ua/
articles/2014/02-6-7009698/view_print/,	accessed	on	10	February	2014.	
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or	even	Kyiv,	and	the	Ukrainian	Orthodox	Church	has	been	the	
only	entity	to	exploit	the	west’s	disdain	in	an	effort	to	build	a	posi-
tive	eastern	identity.	In	practice,	then,	it	does	not	stand	in	the	way	
of	a	consolidation	of	the	‘school’	version	of	state	and	national	iden-
tity	and	the	 local	patriotisms,	which	do	not	pose	a	 threat	 to	 the	
unity	of	the	state.
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Iv. unIty and dIvISIonS In the maIdan  
(and beyond)
The	first	demonstrations	against	Yanukovych’s	decision	not	to	sign	
the	 Association	 Agreement	with	 the	 EU	 in	November	 2013	were	
social	protests:	the	participants	were	mainly	students	and	young	
specialists	with	university	educations,	etc.	These	were	people	who	
did	not	remember	Soviet	Ukraine,17	who	believed	their	personal	in-
terests	to	be	linked	with	the	country’s	pro-Western	course,	who	of-
ten	held	negative	attitudes	to	politics	and	politicians,	and	were	im-
mersed	in	 ‘digital	modernity’.	The	first	radical	organisations	that	
joined	the	protesters	in	Kyiv	also	hailed	from	this	demographic.	
Yet	 as	 Kyiv’s	 Independence	 Square	 became	 the	 Euromaidan,	
the	national	 capital	 of	protests,	 people	 from	other	backgrounds	
started	joining	the	original	group	of	students	and	specialists	from	
various	regions	on	the	Kyiv	Maidan,	in	response	to	the	beating	of	
students	during	the	night	of	29/30	November	2013.	These	included	
numerous	veterans	of	the	war	in	Afghanistan	(from	throughout	
Ukraine,	Donetsk	and	Crimea	included18),	members	of	Cossack	or-
ganisations	from	the	central	and	southern	oblasts,	workers	in	un-
expectedly	large	numbers19,	as	well	as	farmers20;	in	short,	people	
17	 No	detailed	data	is	available	on	the	make-up	of	the	protests	at	that	stage.	Ac-
cording	 to	sociological	 research	 from	December	2013,	people	aged	 15–29	ac-
counted	for	34%	of	the	group	‘on	permanent	duty’	in	the	Maidan,	and	those	
with	 university	 education	 (graduates	 and	 those	 still	 studying)	 were	 59%.	
Specialists	with	university	education	accounted	for	38%	and	students	10%.	It	
should	be	remembered,	though,	that	after	30	November	2013,	representatives	
of	 other	 age	 and	 profession	 demographics	 started	 joining	 the	 protest.	 See	
http://dif.org.ua/ua/jfjeifjoejfowjervojriohvj.htm,	accessed	on	10.01.2014.
18	 Yuri	Butusov,	“‘Afgantsy	Maidana’:	trebovaniye	odno	–	polnaya	perezagru-
zka	vlasti”,		Zerkalo Nedeli, issue	4,	2014.	
19	 According	to	research	from	early	January	2014,	workers	accounted	for	14%	
of	those	permanently	present	on	the	Maidan,	but	only	7%	of	those	gathering	
for	demonstrations.	See	http://dif.org.ua/ua/jfjeifjoejfowjervojriohvj.htm,	
accessed	on	10	January	2014.
20	 Aleks	Lisitsa,	‘Lubov	i	fermery’,	www.epravda.com.ua/columns/204/01/13/	-
414	298/view_priont/,	accessed	on	14	January	2014.	
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representing	different	regions,	generations	and	social	strata,	who	
spoke	different	languages	and	professed	different	religions.21	Peo-
ple	from	all	regions	have	been	present	on	the	Maidan,	even	if	ac-
tivists	from	the	east	and	the	south	have	been	the	least	numerous,	
and	if	Crimea	has	only	been	represented	by	Crimean	Tatars.	
In	situations	of	 revolutionary	 tension,	 the	voices	of	 radicals	are	
particularly	 audible,	 hence	 the	nationalist	 slogans	 and	 symbols	
which	have	been	 conspicuous	 in	 the	Maidan.	However,	 the	na-
tionalists	 have	 moderated	 their	 most	 extreme	 demands:	 even	
though	they	openly	draw	on	the	traditions	of	Stepan	Bandera	and	
the	UPA,	the	nationalist	ideology	in	the	Maidan	has	been	reduced	
to	just	one	slogan,	that	of	sobornost’,	i.e.	the	unity	and	indivisibil-
ity	of	 the	country.	Nobody	there	has	advocated	separating	Gali-
cia	or	expelling	Donbas	or	Kharkiv.	The	aim	of	the	protesters	is	to	
integrate	the	country	more	deeply,	by	including	the	east	and	the	
south	into	the	tradition	of	Ukrainian	statehood	and	nationhood,	
or	perhaps	into	the	tradition	of	nationhood	above	all.
This	is	not	to	say	that	the	earlier	divisions	are	disappearing.	Per-
haps	they	are	not	even	 losing	much	of	 their	strength.	However,	
their	 significance	 is	 changing:	 they	 become	 diversities	 within	
one	 supreme	community,	 the	Nation,	understood	 in	 civil	 terms	
as	 a	 community	of	 all	 inhabitants	of	Ukraine.	The	 fact	 that	 the	
first	person	to	die	on	Hrushevsky	Street	was	an	Armenian	from	
Dnipropetrovsk,	 the	 second	 a	 first-generation	 immigrant	 from	
Belarus,	 and	 only	 the	 third	 a	Ukrainian	 from	western	Ukraine	
(who	was,	by	the	way,	a	professional	soldier	and	an	Iraq	veteran),	
is	a	symbolic	illustration	in	shorthand	of	this	new	quality.	
21	 The	 present	 protest	 action	 was	 the	 first	 in	 the	 history	 of	 independent	
Ukraine	to	include	a	religious	element:	church	services		was	celebrated	on	
the	Maidan,	and	chapels	for	prayer	were	established.	A	more	detailed	dis-
cussion	of	this	aspect	of	the	protests	is	beyond	the	scope	of	the	present	pa-
per,	but	it	is	important	to	note	that	representatives	of	various	confessions	
took	part	in	the	prayers	together.	
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The	 rebellion	 in	 the	 regions	 has	 not	 been	 a	 rebellion	 of	 the	 re-
gions,	either.	It	has	been	one	element	of	an	all-Ukrainian	protest,	
an	element	which,	by	the	way,	joined	in	late	(the	initial	decision	to	
limit	the	protests	to	Kyiv	and	bring	most	of	the	activists	from	the	
provinces	to	the	capital	should	be	seen	as	a	major	mistake	on	the	
part	of	the	leaders).	Even	if	the	protesters	renounced	allegiance	to	
the	central	government,	they	did	not	raise	secessionist	slogans	or	
demand	autonomy,	but	rather	backed	the	demands	of	the	Kyiv	Eu-
romaidan,	which	concerned	the	entire	country.	The	demonstra-
tions	in	the	regions	were	also	a	way	to	protest	against	the	glaring	
abuse	of	the	local	authorities,	but	not	against	links	with	Kyiv	and	
the	other	regions.	
The	 scope	 of	 the	 protest	 campaign	 transcended	 the	 borders	 of	
western	Ukraine	from	the	very	start,	and	while	it	is	true	that	the	
further	east	one	looked,	the	weaker	the	protests	and	the	stronger	
the	backlash	 from	the	authorities,	 this	can	be	explained	by	dif-
ferences	in	the	pre-existing	potentials	for	protest.	While	in	Lviv,	
the	city	mayor	was	at	the	helm	of	the	protests	from	the	start,	in	
Cherkasy	and	Sumy	the	attempts	at	occupying	state	administra-
tion	 buildings	 were	 undertaken	 by	 poorly	 organised	 groups	 of	
people	numbering	only	several	hundred	strong,	and	 in	Kharkiv	
and	Donetsk,	there	was	no-one	to	organise	even	that.	
But	 in	 that	 same	Donetsk,	 the	miners,	pensioners	 and	veterans	
of	the	Afghan	war	who	were	called	on	to	defend	public	buildings	
against	 an	 allegedly	 impending	 ‘invasion	 by	 the	 Right	 Sector’,	
carried	banners	with	slogans	about	the	indivisibility	of	Ukraine;	
for	them,	too,	splitting	the	country	was	out	of	the	question,	even	
though	 they	were	 concerned	 about	 certain	 other	 threats.22	 The	
small	 group	 that	 gathered	 in	 the	 Donetsk	 Euromaidan	was	 de-
fended	against	 the	 titushki	 by	radical	 fans	 (‘ultras’)	of	Shakhtar	
Donetsk.	In	mid-January	groups	of	ultras	from	all	the	major	foot-
ball	clubs	of	Ukraine	(except	for	the	ones	from	Crimea)	appeared	
22	 Cf.	Lina	Kushch,	‘Stabilnist’	iz	kulakami’,	Holos Ukrainy,	28	January	2014.	
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on	the	Kyiv	Maidan	and	backed	the	protest.	Shortly	afterwards	
they	 agreed	 on	 a	 ceasefire;	 the	hostilities	 between	 clubs	had	 to	
give	 way	 (for	 a	 time,	 naturally)	 to	 the	 superior	 interest	 of	 the	
homeland.	
Unlike	in	2004,	the	Party	of	Regions	decided	not	mobilise	its	sup-
porters	into	massive	demonstrations	of	support.	At	that	time	the	
‘anti-Maidan’	in	Donetsk23	was	a	manifestation	of	the	beliefs	of	its	
participants,	 expressed	 spontaneously,	 even	 if	with	 encourage-
ment	and	support	from	the	local	authorities	(the	Orange	Revolu-
tion	in	Kyiv	also	enjoyed	the	near-open	backing	of	the	city	author-
ities).	Presently,	the	anti-Maidans	are	made	up	almost	exclusively	
of	 two	groups	of	people:	officials	and	employees	of	public-sector	
institutions	 (often	women	approaching	 retirement,	 office	work-
ers	or	teachers),	who	are	carrying	out	the	orders	of	their	superi-
ors,	and	young	people	from	the	working	class	or	the	lumpen	pro-
letariat,	who	do	not	even	try	to	deny	that	they	are	participating	
for	money.	Apparently	the	authorities	are	unconvinced	that	those	
who	support	closer	ties	with	Russia	are	still	willing	to	back	the	
rule	of	Viktor	Yanukovych,	or	maybe	they	know	that	this	is	not	
the	 case.	 Therefore,	 they	 prefer	 to	 avoid	 risks,	 and	 limit	 them-
selves	to	actions	which	they	can	control.	But	in	this	way,	they	are	
suppressing	the	potential	for	civil	activity	in	the	‘Eurasian’	camp.
	
23	 This	name	was	not	used	at	that	time.
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v. the Idea of federalISatIon  
and ItS SIgnIfIcance
The	idea	of	transforming	Ukraine	from	a	unitary	state	into	a	fed-
eration	returned	with	new	force	during	the	recent	events.	The	idea	
has	been	introduced	into	public	debate	for	specific	current	political	
reasons,	but	it	refers	back	to	older	discussions	and	concepts.	
Mykhailo	Drahomanov,	the	founding	father	of	Ukrainian	political	
thought,	and	Ukraine’s	greatest	historian	Mykhailo	Hrushevsky	
were	both	advocates	of	a	federal	system	of	government	for	the	fu-
ture	Ukrainian	state.	Yet	during	 the	 independence	war	 in	 1917–
1921,	the	Ukrainian	People’s	Republic	was	established	as	a	unitary	
state	 (which	 formed	 a	 federation	 with	 the	 Western	 Ukrainian	
People’s	Republic	only	because	 it	proved	 impossible	 to	 reconcile	
the	socialist	nature	of	the	UPR	and	the	national-democratic	char-
acter	of	the	WUPR),	although	initially	it	did	not	rule	out	the	possi-
bility	of	maintaining	federal	relations	with	the	‘new’	Russia.	The	
independence	struggle	of	 the	Ukrainians	was	one	of	 the	 factors	
which	contributed	to	the	Soviet	state	formally	becoming	a	federa-
tion.	One	of	the	present-day	consequences	of	this	is	that	the	idea	
of	a	federal	state	is	commonly	misunderstood,	and	‘federation’	is	
taken	to	mean	‘Sovietness’.	
In	1991	Vyacheslav	Chornovil,	the	leader	of	the	People’s	Movement	
of	Ukraine,	put	forward	the	idea	of	reforming	the	organisation	of	
the	Ukrainian	state.	However,	what	he	apparently	meant	was	not	
so	much	the	creation	of	a	federal	state	such	as	Yugoslavia	or	Germa-
ny,	as	a	replacement	of	the	arbitrarily	delineated	borders	of	oblasts	
with	the	borders	of	the	historical	lands,	and	the	award	of	broad	self-
government	powers	or	even	autonomy	to	the	new	administrative	
units.	It	was	a	visionary	project	which,	had	it	been	implemented	in	
the	early	1990s,	would	have	solved	many	of	the	country’s	problems.	
However,	the	project	(or	rather	postulate,	because	an	implementa-
ble	project	was	never	put	forward)	met	with	universal	opposition.	
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The	champions	of	independence	feared	that	federalisation	would	
lead	to	a	break-up	of	Ukraine	and	the	incorporation	of	its	eastern	
regions	into	the	Russian	Federation.	There	was	also	little	enthu-
siasm	for	 the	 idea	 in	eastern	Ukraine	 itself,	and	on	top	of	 that,	
no	specific	concept	of	how	to	organise	the	new	state	developed	at	
that	time.	Several	factors	discouraged	such	experiments,	includ-
ing	the	Crimean	oblast’s	declaration	of	autonomy	(underpinned	
by	a	clear	ambition	to	break	away	from	Ukraine),	the	contempo-
raneous	 disintegration	 of	 the	 Yugoslav	 federation,	 and	 finally,	
the	emergence	of	new	quasi-states	in	the	former	USSR,	not	only	
of	the	kind	of	Transnistria	and	Abkhazia,	but	also	of	Tatarstan	
and	Chechnya.	
The	independence	movement	feared	that	allowing	federalisation,	
or	 even	 granting	 broader	 powers	 to	 the	 local	 self-government	
(at	 that	 time	 the	 distinction	 between	 the	 two	 options	 was	 not	
understood	clearly	enough,	 if	at	all)	would	 lead	to	 the	secession	
of	some	regions.	Those	fears	coincided	with	the	central	bureau-
cracy’s	ambition	to	keep	as	much	power	as	possible	to	itself,	and	
with	the	need	to	ensure	that	the	state	remained	manageable	after	
the	decomposition	of	the	dual	Soviet	system	of	party	committees	
and	 councils	 of	 people’s	 delegates	 (soviets).	 The	 latter	 problem	
was	solved	by	introducing	a	hierarchic	system	of	administration	
(president	 –	 governor	 –	 county	 head).	 As	 a	 result,	 independent	
Ukraine	was	established	not	only	as	a	unitary	state	(despite	the	
recognition	of	Crimea’s	autonomy),	but	also	one	 that	was	exces-
sively	centralised.	
Federalism	re-emerged	as	an	idea	in	late	2004.	During	the	Orange	
Revolution,	a	congress	of	delegates	 from	oblast,	 city	and	county	
councils,	mostly	 from	 southern	 and	 eastern	 Ukraine,	 was	 held	
in	 Severodonetsk.	 Most	 of	 those	 who	 attended	 were	 Yanuko-
vych	supporters.	The	congress	formulated	a	demand	for	the	crea-
tion	of	a	South-Eastern	Ukrainian	Autonomous	Republic	within	
Ukraine,	in	order	to	protect	this	part	of	the	country	from	‘west-
ernisation’	 or,	 as	 some	 said,	 ‘fascistisation’	 under	Yushchenko’s	
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rule.	 However,	 that	 concept	 was	 not	 a	 political	 project	 either,	
but	merely	a	slogan,	and	no-one	thought	about	the	methods	and	
means	that	would	be	needed	to	implement	it.	
The	opponents	of	the	project,	especially	among	Yushchenko	sup-
porters,	 denounced	 it	 as	 separatist,	 and	 after	 their	 victory,	 ac-
cused	the	initiators	of	having	orchestrated	“an	attack	on	Ukraine’s	
territorial	integrity”.	In	this	way	they	discredited	autonomist	as-
pirations	altogether	(presumably	deliberately).	Yet	the	intention	
of	those	who	organised	the	Severodonetsk	congress	was	for	a	new	
autonomous	 republic,	 which	 would	 span	 one-third	 of	 Ukraine,	
from	Kharkiv	 to	Dnipropetrovsk	and	to	Odessa,	having	a	status	
comparable	 with	 that	 of	 the	 Autonomous	 Republic	 of	 Crimea,	
rather	than	being	an	independent	state	or	a	republic	within	the	
Russian	Federation.	For	Yevhen	Kushnaryov,	one	of	the	main	pro-
moters	of	the	idea,	the	main	objective	may	well	have	been	to	make	
Kharkiv	a	capital	again.
However,	what	was	possible	 in	 the	 case	 of	Crimea	was	not	 fea-
sible	in	the	case	of	the	proposed	republic.	Granting	autonomy	to	
a	region	 inhabited	by	nearly	a	 third	of	 the	country’s	population	
and	hosting	the	lion’s	share	of	its	economic	potential	would	have	
transformed	Ukraine	into	a	dualist	country	and	made	it	inevita-
bly	unstable,	even	with	a	reasonable	division	of	prerogatives	be-
tween	the	two	capitals.	The	South-Eastern	Republic	itself	would	
also	be	unstable,	as	there	is	no	‘south-eastern’	identity	to	bind	to-
gether	the	 inhabitants	of	Odessa,	Donetsk	and	Kharkiv,	and	the	
three	regions	do	not	share	economic	or	other	interests;	the	only	
thing	that	they	have	in	common	is	their	dependence	on	Kyiv	(or	
some	other	external	centre).	
After	Yushchenko	 came	 to	 power,	 calls	 for	 autonomy	 subsided,	
and	after	Kushnaryov	died	in	2007,	the	Party	of	Regions	once	again	
became	 the	 party	 of	 a	 single	 region,	 representing	 the	 interests	
of	 the	Donetsk	Basin,	rather	 than	the	entire	eastern	and	south-
ern	 Ukraine.	 Since	 then,	 calls	 for	 autonomy	 would	 sometimes	
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re-emerge	in	Donetsk,	but	always	on	the	margins	of	political	life,	
even	at	the	regional	level.	
After	 the	outbreak	of	mass	protests	 in	November	2013,	 the	sub-
ject	of	the	federalisation	of	Ukraine	returned	with	new	force,	and	
in	a	way	which	suggested	that	it	had	been	introduced	into	public	
discourse	in	a	deliberate	and	controlled	way.	As	early	as	Decem-
ber	2013,	Viktor	Medvedchuk,	a	 former	head	of	 the	Presidential	
Administration	under	Leonid	Kuchma	who	was	considered	to	be	
the	main	lobbyist	for	Moscow’s	interests,	said	that	“the	break-up	
of	Ukraine	was	a	fait	accompli”,24	and	on	several	occasions	later	on	
he	spoke	about	federalisation	as	a	way	out	of	the	ongoing	crisis,	
or	even	the	only	way	of	preventing	the	disintegration	of	Ukraine	
(without,	however,	identifying	where	the	threat	of	such	disinte-
gration	would	come	from).25	He	was	backed,	 in	almost	 the	same	
words,	by	Ukraine’s	leading	Russophile,	Vadym	Kolesnichenko.26	
Some	Russian	politicians	also	expressed	similar	views,	including	
President	Putin’s	close	aide	Sergei	Glazyev.27	On	the	other	hand,	
some	members	of	the	ruling	camp	spoke	out	against	federalism,	
including	Andriy	Shyshatski,	the	head	of	the	Donetsk	oblast	ad-
ministration.28	Others,	including	the	head	of	Kharkiv’s	oblast	ad-
ministration	Mykhailo	Dobkin,	supported	federalisation	(consid-
ering	it	to	be	the	only	possible	variant	of	decentralisation!29)	but	at	
24	 www.pravda.com.ua/news/2013/12/6/7005273/,	accessed	on	6	December	2013.	
25	 Cf.	e.g.	Viktor	Medvedchuk,	Eta	 igra	slishkom	dorogo	obkhoditsia,	http://
lenta.ru/articles/2014/02/04/medvedchu/,	accessed	on	5	February	2014.	
26	 Cf.	e.g.	[http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/kolesnichenko/52ea62deca835/,	
accessed	on	31	January	2014.	
27	 Cf.	http://www.kommersant.ua/doc/2400532,	accessed	on	10	February	2014.	
28	 www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/02/10/7013349,	accessed	on	10	February	2014.	
29	 It	 is	worth	noting	 that	 federalisation	does	not	necessarily	have	 to	 involve	
the	introduction	of	local	self-government,	as	it	may	well	be	limited	to	dupli-
cating	the	bureaucratic	centralism	at	the	regional	level.	For	more	informa-
tion	on	the	problems	associated	with	the	organisation	of	regional	and	local	
government	in	Ukraine,	see	Tadeusz	Iwański,	Piotr	Żochowski,	‘Under	the	
veneer	of	decentralisation	Ukraine’s	modernisation	efforts	stall	due	to	lack	
of	local	government	reform’,	OSW	commentary,	issue	102,	12	February	2013.	
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the	same	time	admitted	that	it	would	not	be	possible	to	carry	it	out	
during	the	present	crisis.30
This	time	around,	however,	the	federalisation	discourse	provoked	
an	unexpectedly	strong	reaction	on	the	part	of	its	opponents,	and	
the	impetus	of	criticism	deepened	the	impression	that	a	serious,	
or	 in	 any	 case	 realistic,	 political	 project	 was	 at	 hand.	 Yaroslav	
Hrytsak	spoke	of	a	Russian	“plan	for	a	break-up	of	Ukraine”,	and	
accused	 the	 Presidential	 Administration	 chief	 Andriy	 Klyuyev,	
and	 thus	 indirectly	 Yanukovych	 himself,	 of	 implementing	 this	
plan.31	Vyacheslav	Kyrylenko,	 the	 leader	of	one	of	 the	pro-Euro-
pean	parties,	said	that	“an	order	for	federalisation	had	come	from	
the	Kremlin”,32	etc.	Taras	Chornovil	(son	of	Vyacheslav,	a	former	
politician	of	Our	Ukraine,	then	the	Party	of	Regions),	who	in	fact	
considers	the	federal	system	of	government	to	be	an	adequate	so-
lution	for	Ukraine,	went	as	far	as	to	say	that	Klyuyev	was	carrying	
out	a	Russian	plan	to	split	Ukraine	into	three	parts	(the	east	and	
south,	fully	controlled	by	Moscow,	the	centre,	indirectly	depend-
ent	on	Russia,	and	the	west,	which	would	be	“pushed	out”	to	be-
come	a	separate	state).33	
Notable	against	this	background	was	the	calm	opinion	expressed	
by	the	former	Verkhovna Rada	speaker	Volodymyr	Lytvyn	who	said	
that	the	calls	for	federalism,	while	posing	a	threat	to	the	country,	
were	merely	 “political	 technologies”,	 and	Ukraine	 needed	 to	 be	
rebuilt	along	the	lines	of	“unitary	decentralisation”.34	The	former	
30	 www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/02/12/7013658,	accessed	on	13	February	2014.	
31	 Piotr	Jendroszczyk,	‘To	Rosja	rozdaje	karty’,		Rzeczpospolita,	24	January	2014.	
32	 http://blogs.pravda.com.ua/authors/kyrylenko/52eb9cfca4eb0/view_
print/,	accessed	on	31	January	2014.	
33	 Taras	 Chornovil,	 ‘Mene	 realno	 nudyt’	 vid	 zayav	 opozytsiynykh	 lideriv’,	
www.from-ua.com/adds/print.php?politics/b4239338fc1dc,	 accessed	 on	 24	
January	2014.	
34	 Volodymyr	Lytvyn,	‘Postanovka	voprosa	o	federalizatsyi	nesyot	ugrozu	raz-
vala	strany’,	www.from-ua.com/adds/pront.php?politics/dc14da87628ad,	
accessed	on	6	February	2014.	
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president	Leonid	Kuchma	also	denounced	federalism	as	a	threat	
to	the	sovereignty	of	Ukraine.35	
The	 authors	 of	 this	 narrative,	 which	may	 indeed	 have	 been	 in-
vented	in	Moscow	or	in	Russophile	circles	in	Kyiv,	intended	it	to	
impede	any	resolution	of	the	current	crisis	and	the	emergence	of	
a	 nationwide	 front	 of	 opposition	 against	 Yanukovych,	 and	 per-
haps	also	to	disrupt	any	agreement	between	the	president	and	that	
camp.	The	predictable,	violent	and	at	times	even	hysterical	reac-
tion	of	the	‘protest	camp’,	including	the	open	accusations	of	trea-
son	levelled	at	the	president	and	the	allegations	that	his	aim	was	to	
become	the	‘governor	of	Little	Russia’,	etc.,	could	presumably	have	
been	intended	by	the	authors	of	the	plan	for	federalisation.	In	this	
way,	the	possibility	of	seriously	discussing	the	possible	options	of	
reforming	Ukraine’s	internal	system	of	government	was	blocked	
again:	any	reference	to	federalisation	in	the	course	of	works	on	the	
new	constitution	will	be	decried	as	an	act	of	treason.	In	this,	the	
opponents	of	federalisation	will	be	backed	by	the	main	force	op-
posed	to	the	decentralisation	of	Ukraine,	i.e.	the	bureaucracy.	
35	 www.pravda.com.ua/news/2014/02/10/7013291,	accessed	on	10	February	2014.	
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vI. from moScow’S poInt of vIew
It	is	a	widespread	belief	that	Russia	is	not	only	promoting	a	nar-
rative	about	the	impending	disintegration	of	Ukraine	and	the	ne-
cessity	of	transforming	the	country	into	a	loose	federation	(which	
is	beyond	any	doubt36),	but	also	taking	measures	to	de facto	split	
the	Ukrainian	state	in	order	to	keep	at	least	part	of	it	within	its	
sphere	of	influence.	This	view	does	not	seem	to	be	justified.	The	
references	 to	Moscow’s	backing	of	 the	 secession	of	Abkhazia	 or	
the	Transnistrian	and	Crimean	separatisms	in	the	early	1990s	are	
tenuous	because	those	developments	took	place	while	the	Soviet	
Union	was	falling	apart	(all	the	post-Soviet	quasi-states	were	es-
tablished	before	December	1991	during	the	so-called	‘sovereignty	
parade’),	 at	 a	 time	of	 deep	 instability	 and	disorientation.	Today	
the	post-Soviet	 states	 are	well-established	 and	 full-fledged	 sub-
jects	of	international	 law,	and	the	international	situation	is	also	
different:	it	would	be	difficult	today	to	imagine	Western	powers	
recognising	the	division	of	a	sovereign	state,	unless	it	happened	
as	a	result	of	a	long	war	and	an	international	peace	intervention.37	
And	allowing	UN-mandated	peacekeepers	 to	be	deployed	 in	 the	
former	Soviet	area	would	be	a	political	disaster	for	Russia.	
If	one	looks	at	rational	arguments,	a	division	of	Ukraine	leading	
to	one	part	becoming	dependent	on	Moscow	and	the	other	on	the	
West	would	not	be	a	favourable	outcome	from	Moscow’s	point	of	
view,	mainly	because	the	objective	of	Russia’s	policy	(which	from	
its	own	point	of	view	is	perfectly	rational)	 is	to	subordinate	the	
whole	of	Ukraine	while	at	the	same	time	eliminating,	or	at	least	
mitigating,	the	European	Union’s	and	the	USA’s	distrust	of	Russia.	
Russia	 also	understands	 that	Ukraine’s	 association	with	 the	EU	
will	not	put	an	end	to	Russian	influence	in	that	country,	contrary	
36	 Russia	has	repeatedly	used	this	threat	since	1991.
37	 The	EU’s	resistance	to	recognise	Catalonia’s	or	Scotland’s	right	to	secession	
is	an	indication	that	the	Union	will	be	even	less	willing	to	recognise	the		di-
vision	of	states	in	whose	democratic	order	Brussels	has	little	faith.
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to	what	large	numbers	of	Ukrainians	believe.	On	the	other	hand,	
it	would	not	be	possible	to	“federalise”	Ukraine	in	such	a	way	as	
to	permit	one	part	of	it	to	join	the	Customs	Union,	and	the	other	
to	remain	outside	of	it.	This	would	only	be	possible	if	Ukraine	was	
split	into	several	new	states.	
Yet	 a	hypothetical	western-Ukrainian	 state	would	be	decisively	
hostile	to	Russia	and	would	intensively	promote	so-called	Russo-
phobia.	As	a	 result	 of	 the	 split,	Russia	would	also	 lose	 access	 to	
Transcarpathia,	where	it	holds	major	sway.	If	Ukraine	was	split	
into	 several	 parts	 (even	 if	 that	 went	 no	 further	 than	 real	 fed-
eralisation)	 this	would	 render	 it	difficult	 for	Moscow	 to	 combat	
centrifugal	 tendencies	 (towards	decentralisation	or	 separatism)	
at	home,	and	would	encourage	advocates	of	such	projects	within	
Russia	to	act.	
Moreover,	 if	Russia	backed	the	break-up	of	the	Ukrainian	state,	
it	 would	 have	 to	 shoulder	 the	 responsibility	 for	 the	 crumbling	
Ukrainian	economy,	sections	of	which	compete	with	Russia’s	own	
economy.	This	would	impose	a	very	serious	burden	on	the	budget	
of	the	Russian	Federation.	Russia	would	also	have	to	sustain	the	
fiction	that	the	rump	Ukrainian	state	was	still	a	separate	entity	
–	any	potential	annexation	of	part	of	it	would	not	be	recognised	
by	 the	 community	of	nations,	 entailing	 losses	 for	Russia	on	 the	
international	stage	which	would	be	difficult	to	assess.	
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vII.  a SpecIal caSe: crImea
Crimea,	with	its	strong	regional	identity,	pro-Russian	separatist	
sentiments	and	the	frozen	ethnic	conflict	between	the	Slavic	pop-
ulation	(both	Russians	and	Ukrainians)	on	the	one	hand	and	the	
Crimean	Tatars	on	the	other,	poses	a	separate	problem.	If	the	pen-
insula	has	remained	peaceful	in	recent	days	(February	2014),	this	
was	only	because	it	was	part	of	Ukraine	and	the	Crimean	Tatars	
were	standing	up	for	Ukraine’s	independence	and	indivisibility.
The	Crimean	elites	backed	the	Yanukovych	camp	in	the	present	
crisis,	 and	 after	 it	 collapsed,	 the	 potential	 for	 social	 discontent	
arose	 in	 the	Autonomous	Republic	of	Crimea	and	 in	Sevastopol.	
The	objectives	were	different	than	in	the	Euromaidans	elsewhere	
in	Ukraine,	though:	the	main	demands	concerned	deeper	autono-
my	to	prevent	an	import	of	western	Ukrainian	cultural	models	to	
Crimea,	and	stopping	eastern	Ukrainian	business	(with	its	links	
to	the	Party	of	Regions)	controlling	the	peninsula’s	economy.	The	
former	set	of	demands,	championed	by	Russophile	organisations	
(with	 backing	 from	 Russia),	 gained	 new	 justification	when	 the	
Verkhovna Rada	imprudently	repealed	a	law	granting	broad	rights	
to	the	Russian	language.	However,	the	second	aspect	is	more	im-
portant;	the	elites	of	Crimea	wanted	to	govern	themselves	(while	
remaining	within	 the	Ukrainian	state),	and	that	aspiration	was	
very	popular	with	the	public	in	Crimea.	
On	the	other	hand	in	Sevastopol,	which	is	still	primarily	a	Russian	
navy	base,	the	inhabitants	removed	Ukrainian	state	symbols	from	
most	of	the	places	where	they	were	displayed,	proclaimed	a	new	
mayor	 in	 a	 political	 rally,	 and	demanded	 self-rule	 for	 the	 city.38	
There	were	also	calls	for	the	city	to	join	Russia,	a	move	that	would	
38	 Sevastopol	 is	 the	only	city	 in	Ukraine	managed	by	a	head	of	state	admin-
istration	(the	equivalent	of	a	governor)	appointed	by	the	president.	Its	dis-
tricts,	on	the	other	hand,	have	local	self-governments.	
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be	highly	popular	 in	Sevastopol	even	without	 those	 ‘prompters’	
from	Russia	who	have	undoubtedly	also	been	involved.39	
The	political	slogans	demanding	independence	for	Crimea	or	its	
joining	Russia	are	marginal,	and	match	neither	the	interests	nor	
the	views	of	 the	political	 elite	of	Crimea.40	The	main	reason	 for	
this	is	that	the	Tatar	community	would	account	for	around	12–15%	
of	the	population	of	independent	Crimea,	rising	towards	20–25%	
within	a	short	time,	and	would	demand	that	the	new	state	should	
become	a	Crimean-Tatar	national	state,41	or	at	least	a	bi-national	
state.	 Such	 demands	 would	 trigger	 a	 violent	 reaction	 from	 the	
Russian	majority,	destabilising	the	new	state.
Should	Crimea	become	part	of	Russia,	officials	and	oligarchs	from	
Russia,	who	are	more	powerful	and	more	efficient,	would	replace	
the	Ukrainian	officials	and	oligarchs	now	influencing	the	affairs	
of	Crimea.	In	such	a	case	it	is	almost	certain	that	the	republic	could	
not	maintain	its	present	level	of	autonomy.	For	Russia,	the	incor-
poration	of	Crimea	would	increase	the	potential	for	irredentism	
in	 the	Russian	Federation	by	adding	a	 large	and	well-organised	
community	of	Crimean	Tatars	which	 in	 the	new	circumstances	
would	be	hostile	to	Russia.	
39	 When	 this	 text	was	 finished,	 the	 situation	 in	 Crimea	was	 very	 unstable.	
Shortly	afterwards	Russia	annexed	the	peninsula	following	a	sham	refer-
endum.	
40	 The	Razumkov	Centre	research	quoted	above	shows	that	only	12%	of	peo-
ple	 in	 the	 southern	 region	 would	 back	 the	 independence	 of	 their	 home	
oblast,	and	13%	would	favour	a	merger	with	another	oblast,	while	81%	and	
17%	 respectively	would	 be	 definitely	 against	 such	moves	 (http://glavcom.
ua.articles/17966.html,	accessed	on	4.03.2014).	A	breakdown	of	data	for	in-
dividual	administrative	units	is	not	available,	but	since	the	inhabitants	of	
Crimea	account	for	around	a	third	of	the	total	population	of	the	southern	
region	in	the	meaning	assumed	in	the	study,	and	separatist	tendencies	are	
hardly	present	beyond	Crimea,	it	can	be	inferred	that	although	the	popular-
ity	of	separatist	calls	is	much	higher	in	Crimea	than	elsewhere	in	the	region,	
the	opponents	of	separatism	are	still	more	numerous	than	its	advocates.	
41	 Cf.	 the	 statement	 by	Mustafa	 Dzhemilev,	 a	 senior	 Crimean	 Tatar	 leader,	
http://www.rp.pl/artykul/40,1090435-Dzemilew--Tatarzy-krymscy-nie-
chca-obcej-wladzy-na-polwyspie.html,	accessed	on	28	February	2014.	
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concluSIonS
While	this	paper	was	being	written,	the	Ukrainian	conflict	led	to	
the	toppling	of	the	Yanukovych	government	–	a	development	that	
the	 eastern	 and	 southern	 regions	 of	Ukraine	 accepted.	 In	 some	
regions	separatist	demands	were	raised;	in	Crimea	the	local	elite	
made	attempts	at	gaining	broader	autonomy,	and	the	inhabitants	
of	Sevastopol	openly	called	for	the	city	to	become	part	of	Russia.	
The	Russian	 authorities	 and	 armed	 forces	 have	 actively	 backed	
those	 developments.	 However,	 regardless	 of	 how	 the	 situation	
in	 Crimea	 develops,	 the	 likelihood	 of	 the	 secession	 of	 eastern	
Ukraine	is	very	low.
The	events	of	recent	months	have	strengthened,	not	undermined,	
the	internal	unity	of	Ukraine.	Despite	the	existence	of	deep	social,	
political	and	regional	divisions,	 the	recent	conflict	has	not	been	
a	clash	between	two	parts	of	the	nation.	It	has	been	a	conflict	be-
tween	the	ruling	camp	and	the	activist-minded	parts	of	the	nation	
demanding	change.	Splitting	the	country,	even	in	the	form	of	fed-
eralisation,	is	not	the	objective	of	either	side.	Instead,	it	is	a	con-
flict	about	preserving	 the	status quo	or	bringing	about	change	–	
throughout	 the	 country.	The	claims	 that	have	been	made	about	
an	impending	split	of	the	country	have	mainly	been	a	propaganda	
instrument	in	the	political	conflict,	and	have	served	as	a	means	of	
political	sabotage	for	the	Russian	Federation.
There	is	no	reason	to	believe	that	Ukraine	faces	a	threat	of	break-
up.	It	could	only	disintegrate	as	a	result	of	a	protracted	civil	war.	
That,	however,	is	hardly	conceivable,	as	the	conflict	at	hand	is	be-
tween	the	people	and	the	state	apparatus,	and	not	between	two	
social	groups.	Furthermore,	such	a	war	would	run	counter	to	the	
interests	of	all	 the	players	 in	the	current	conflict,	 including	the	
Russian	Federation.	
The	fact	that	the	subject	of	Ukraine’s	federalisation/division	is	be-
ing	exploited	in	the	political	conflict	diverts	attention	away	from	
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reflections	on	reforming	Ukraine’s	system	of	government,	which	
should	 introduce	 genuine	 regional	 self-governance	 with	 broad	
prerogatives,	instead	of	the	present	illusory	self-rule.	This	is	one	
of	the	challenges	facing	Ukraine.42	However,	no	solution	to	it	can	
be	found	or	implemented	amidst	the	revolutionary	heat.	
tadeuSz a. olSzańSkI
42	 For	more	information,	see	T.	Iwański,	P.	Żochowski,	op. cit.
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